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Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual property, and how this effects the applicability of
section 365(n), which provides protections for intellectual property licensees. Part III analyzes
the extent to which trademark licenses can be assigned by debtor-licensees under section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
I.

PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE PURPOSE OF
FEDERAL TRADEMARK LAW

The fundamental purpose of trademark law is to ensure consumer protection in the
marketplace. A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, or design which is used to signal to
consumers a certain quality, reputation and/or trustworthiness produced by a particular source.2
Simply put, trademarks act as source-identifiers as to the origin of a particular good or service,
and provide consumers with a means of association.3
Federal trademark law provides the opportunity for trademark owners to license out their
trademarks to licensees. Trademark licensing enables trademark owners to maximize the
complete potential of their trademarks, while also expanding consumer recognition in the
marketplace. The benefits of trademark licensing include territorial and market expansion,
utilizing new capacities such as manufacturing, distribution or advertising capabilities, and
preventing trademarks from falling out of use.4 These benefits lead to an increased consumer
recognition of the trademark as signaling a particular quality or reputation of the goods/services
being purchased. Moreover, trademark licenses play a role in mitigating infringement suits, as
often times, owners will license out their marks in order to avoid costly litigation fees.5
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Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, USPTO.GOV, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademarkbasics/trademark-patent-or-copyright (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
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See Module 12: Trademark Licensing, WIPO.INT,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/ip_panorama_12_learning_points.pdf (last visited
Mar 25, 2018).
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In trademark licensing, the licensor plays the more important role, as it has the ultimate
say over who it licenses the trademark to and the subsequent rights under which the licensee will
operate. The licensor must ensure that its licensees are providing uniformity in the quality of
goods/services being represented under the trademark or face severe penalties, including losing
all rights to its trademark.6 In order to ensure such uniformity, licensors must have the final say
over all quality control elements of the goods and/or services which bear the licensed trademark.
Consequently, the licensor must have unilateral control of who operates the terms of the licenses.
This means including terms within the trademark licenses which ensure that the licensor can
maintain oversight over production or execution of goods/services bearing the trademark.
Additionally, this may mean ensuring that a licensee can never assign the license to a third party,
without at least the consent of the licensor. It is important to ensure that trademark licensors are
able to maintain such control, in order to meet this mandated duty, even in non-trademark law.
II.

THE RIGHTS OF LICENSEES IN DEBTOR-LICENSOR BANKRUPTCY CASES:
APPLICABILITY OF PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY SECTION 365(n) TO
TRADEMARK LICENSEES

The most important right of a licensor, in any context, is maintaining control over the use
of its trademark in connection with particular goods and/or services. In the context of bankruptcy
cases, this right of the licensor must be upheld no matter which party is filing for bankruptcy.
Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor-licensor to reject any executory contract
that is not beneficial to the company.7 This is consistent with enabling the licensor to maintain
final say over use of the trademark, by allowing the licensor to terminate licenses when they are
doing more harm than good. For example, in a situation where the licensor can no longer ensure
that a licensee is producing goods/services in the manner the trademark indicates, allowing a
6

See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (“A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall be
assignable with the good will of the business in which the mark is used.”) (emphasis added).
7
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389, 394 (1st Cir. 2018).
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licensee to continue operating under that license would be detrimental to the trademark’s
function as a source-identifier. Thus, allowing the licensor the ability to terminate such licenses
to preserve the goodwill of the trademark is consistent with federal trademark law. In response to
such rejections by trademark licensors, licensees have attempted to invoke protections offered to
intellectual property licensees under section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Upon a licensor-debtor’s rejection of a license under section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, trademark licensees have looked to section 365(n) for remedies. Section 365(n) provides
intellectual property licensees with two potential remedies in the event a debtor-licensor rejects
its license: (1) to treat the license as terminated and seek pre-petition damages; or (2) to retain its
rights under the license for the remaining duration of the license.8 However, the absence of
“trademark” from the definition of “intellectual property” in the Bankruptcy Code leaves
uncertainty as to whether trademark licensees can invoke the protections offered by section
365(n).9 Some courts argue that the absence of “trademark” is significant and indicates that
Congress meant trademarks to be excluded from this section, especially since other types of
intellectual property such as copyright, trade secrets and patents are listed in the Bankruptcy
Code’s definition.10 On the other hand, some courts have found that the absence of the term
“trademark” from the definition of intellectual property to be much less significant, and therefore
allow section 365(n) to be invoked by trademark licensees.11
Where courts have taken a narrow, textual view of the definition of intellectual property,
the invocation of section 365(n) by licensees has been found inapplicable. In In re Tempnology,
LLC, the debtor-licensor attempted to terminate its licenses with the licensee. In response, the
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11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).
10
See In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 396-97.
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See In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. 766, 768-69 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).
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licensee attempted to invoke section 365(n), arguing that it should be able to retain its rights to
the license for the remaining duration of the license.12 There, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit found that though section 365(n) was enacted to better balance the rights of intellectual
property licensees, the absence of trademark from the definition of intellectual property in the
Bankruptcy Code was significant and intentional on the part of Congress.13 The court concluded
that this absence rendered section 365(n) inapplicable to trademark licensees, and therefore, its
protections could not be invoked.14 Other courts have also discussed this narrow view of the
applicability of section 365(n), explaining that the absence of trademark from the definition in
the Bankruptcy Code indicated that Congress wanted courts to follow Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc.
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. in trademark licensee cases.15 Lubrizol was decided prior to
the enactment of section 365(n), and stood for the proposition that upon rejection by an
intellectual property licensor of the license, the licensee can no longer use any of the licensed
intellectual property.16 Courts have justified this narrow view by emphasizing the importance in
ensuring trademark licensors can uphold their duty under federal trademark law to maintain
control over the quality of the goods/services which bear the trademark.17
Not all courts have found the absence of trademark from the definition of intellectual
property in the Bankruptcy Code to be as significant in determining the applicability of section
365(n). The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey took this approach in the case of In
re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., and rather than focusing on the definition of intellectual property, the
court engaged in an equity analysis.18 The court there concluded that preventing the trademark
12

In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d at 401.
Id. at 394-95.
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Id. at 404.
15
686 F.3d at 375.
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Id.; See also Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
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See In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 402-03.
18
In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., 522 B.R. at 768-69.
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licensees in the case from asserting section 365(n) would be inequitable, and thus held that its
provisions applied to trademark licenses.19 Other courts have taken similar views, and have
found the omission of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property insignificant when
determining the applicability of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.20
III.
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The licensor’s right to maintain control over its trademark has also been a primary
consideration in the context of debtor-licensee bankruptcy cases. Under section 365(a) a debtorlicensee may assume or reject an executory contract as long as the debtor provides adequate
assurance of performance by the third-party assignee.21 Using this provision, some trademark
licensees have attempted to assign their licenses, usually in a sale of their assets to third-parties,
without the consent of the licensor.22 However, section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
emphasizes such assignment will not stand if it is prohibited by the relevant non-bankruptcy law,
here the relevant non-bankruptcy law being federal trademark law.23 The general consensus
among courts concerning assignment of trademark licenses is that federal trademark law prevents
assignment without the consent of the licensor, unless otherwise provided in the license.
Nevertheless, as with all rules, courts have engaged in different interpretations of the ability of a
trademark licensee to assign a license.
One such court that required consent was the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware, which held that a trademark licensee could not assign its license as part of a

19

Id. at 770-72.
See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he limited
definition in § 101(35A) means that § 365(n) does not affect trademarks one way or the other.”).
21
11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
22 22
. See In re Rupari Holding Corp., 573 B.R 111, 114-15 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
23
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1).
20
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sale of substantially all of its assets without consent of the licensor.24 The court focused on
section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in its reasoning and applied federal trademark law as
the relevant non-bankruptcy law.25 The court relied on its previous decision in In re Trump
Entertainment Resorts, Inc., in which it held that federal trademark law generally bans
assignment of trademark licenses without the licensors approval.26 In In re Trump Entertainment
Resorts, the court reasoned that consent was necessary in order to ensure that a trademark
licensor could uphold its duty to provide uniform quality of the products bearing the licensor’s
trademark.27 Though there is an exception to this rule, in which parties may “contract around”
the general disallowance by including otherwise in the license itself, in this case no such thing
had occurred.28 Therefore, the court found in favor of the licensors, holding section 365(c)(1)
applicable and preventing the debtor-licensees from assigning the license to the third-party buyer
of its assets.29 The Seventh Circuit made similar observations regarding the sensibility in having
a default rule requiring consent of the licensor in the assignment of trademark licenses, even in
bankruptcy.30 The court reasoned that the duty of the licensor to maintain control as to the
quality of the goods/services bearing the trademark and the role of trademarks in protecting
consumers made such a rule justifiable.31
There have been limited instances in which assignments without the consent of the
licensor have been upheld. This occurred when a court declined to use federal trademark law as
the relevant non-bankruptcy law, and instead used a different non-bankruptcy law. For example,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found consent was
24

In re Rupari Holding Corp., 573 B.R. at 120.
Id. at 117.
26
Id.; see In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 526 B.R. 116 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
27
In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, 526 B.R. at 123–24.
28
In re Rupari Holding Corp., 573 B.R. at 117-18.
29
Id. at 118-19.
30
In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2011).
31
Id.
25
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not needed in an assignment, but did so using a personal services law of the state of Pennsylvania
as opposed to federal trademark law.32 This result has been called into question by other courts,
primarily the court’s failure to assess the assignment under federal trademark law.33
CONCLUSION
Trademark licensees can run into obstacles in asserting the rights and protections offered
under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The reasoning for this, as many courts explain, is due
to the licensor’s responsibility under federal trademark law to maintain oversight over the quality
of the goods and/or services which bear the licensed mark. Due to the uncertainty caused by the
absence of trademark under the definition of intellectual property in the Bankruptcy Code, courts
have taken varying positions as to whether the protections offered to intellectual property
licensees under section 365(n) apply to trademark licensees. Though there is more certainty
regarding the need for licensor consent in the event that a licensee wants to assign its license
under section 365(a), this too has not been set in stone. As of now, without the inclusion of
trademarks as part of the definition of intellectual property, licensees must be proactive in
protecting their rights, rather than relying solely on section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. This
should be done through inserting provisions into the licenses at the time they are executed, with
such provisions explicitly dealing with issues of potential rejections by a debtor-licensors and
assignability of the licenses by debtor-licensees. On the other hand, licensors can likely find
safety in the Bankruptcy Code, as it is often interpreted in a manner which enables licensors to
maintain their duties of quality control imposed by federal trademark law.
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In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
See In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 526 B.R. at 126.
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